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Abstract
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with
two regions which can differ for the willingness to pay of their consumers
or for the market size; firms sequentially choose to settle in one region
and then simultaneously compete in prices, selling their products both
on the local market and on the foreigner one by exporting them at a fixed
cost. We study how strategic interaction influences firms’ location choices
and we show that the decision whether to agglomerate or not crucially
depends on the extent of regions’ asymmetries, but, counter intuitively,
there are parametric regions in which the model predicts that the leader
(the first firm choosing location) settles either in the poorer or in the
smaller region, leaving the other one to the follower. Welfare analysis
completes the paper.
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JEL Classification: D43, L13, R12.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the geographical location choices of firms selling vertically dif-
ferentiated variants of a commodity. The study of the distribution of activities
among locations has been widely investigated by economic theory. Industrial
Organization has mostly dealt with horizontal product differentiation, depart-
ing from the pioneering work of Hotelling (1929). The flexibility of the linear
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(or circular) city model has allowed scholars to deeply exploit the parallelism
between geographic space and product space. An important result of this liter-
ature is that if firms compete in prices they tend to locate far from each other
(D’Aspremont et al. (1979), D’Aspremont et al. (1983), Hamilton et al. (1989),
Kats (1995)); the basic intuition behind the result of maximum differentiation is
that, once firms locate close to one another, price competition becomes intense
and decreases profits.
However, Anderson and Neven (1991) show that setting quantity rather than
price as the strategic variable may contribute to agglomeration.
Recently, Pal (1998) suggests that whether firms agglomerate or not depends
not only on market structure, but also on the actual shape of the market. In fact,
if firms choose sequentially locations and quantities, different location patterns
emerge: in a circular city, firms locate equidistant from each other and in a
linear city, firms agglomerate at the center.
In addition, IO literature has outlined the existence of some forces that
may make firms prefer to locate near each other. In de Palma et al. (1985)
large enough heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes relaxes price competition and
may lead to minimum differentiation. Collusion is another mechanism that,
by keeping prices high, may contribute to agglomeration (Jehiel (1992) and
Friedman and Thisse (1993)).1
There is also a large body of literature in International Trade that studies
the same issue and investigates the factors that influence the geographic distrib-
ution of firms. New Economic Geography (NEG) models (see Krugman (1991),
Fujita et al. (1999) for instance), assume that the set of geographic locations
among which agents can choose is discrete; in addition, most of this literature
relies on models of monopolistic competition, usually in the Dixit-Stiglitz for-
malization: firms are small relative to the size of the market, so that strategic
interdependence among firms is ruled out.2
The aim of this paper is to study the location choices of firms operating in a
vertically differentiated industry; in particular, we emphasize the role of strategic
interaction in determining the equilibrium geographic distribution of firms. Our
objective is to study firms’ incentives to agglomerate when the possible locations
1Other explanations on the existence of agglomeration are based on the fact that consumers
are not perfectly informed about prices or product characteristics and are often characterized
by tastes that are not uniformly distributed.
2The assumption is that there is a continuum of firms, so that “the effect of the price of
any one good on the demand of any other will be negligible. The result is that each firm
can ignore the effect of its actions on other firms’ behavior, eliminating the indeterminacies
of oligopoly” (Krugman (1980)).
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differ because of consumers characteristics: willingness to pay and market size.
Consistently, we abstract from technological asymmetries between firms.
The analysis is based on a model in which two firms, each one producing
one (out of two) variant of a vertically differentiated good, sequentially choose
to settle in one (out of two) region and then simultaneously compete in prices,
selling their products both on their local market and exporting them, at a
fixed cost to the foreigner one. Our approach differs from the linear city one,
because we restrict the set of possible geographical locations to a discrete one:
indeed firms, when deciding where to settle physically, are confronted, at least
at a first moment, with a discrete set of countries, regions or cities, and we
consider as exogenous the vertical quality levels of varieties. On the other hand,
differently from the NEG approach, we adopt a partial equilibrium approach and
we explicitly model strategic interaction between firms. The structure of our
model is formally related to the contributions by Schmitt (1995) and Andaluz
(2000) who study the issue of product choice in oligopoly where two markets are
separated by transportation costs. These authors, however, do not deal with
firms’ geographical location choices.
We study the sequential location choices of firms as a function of the pa-
rameters defining the asymmetries between locations. Our results show, as it
would have been expected, that the decision whether to agglomerate or not
crucially depends on the extent of such asymmetries, but, interestingly, there
are parametric configurations for which the model predicts that the leader (the
first firm choosing location) settles either in the poorer or in the smaller region,
leaving the other one to the follower. Welfare analysis completes the study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present
the model. section 3 is devoted to equilibrium analysis while in section 4 we
study the welfare properties of the model. In section 5 we briefly discuss the
results proposing some interpretations concerning firms (re)location and the role
of public intervention, finally section 6 provides a short conclusion.
2 The model
Consider an oligopolistic industry in which two geographic locations are possible
and label these two regions A and B. Moreover, assume that two firms can
produce one of the two variants (h for high-quality and l for low-quality) of a
vertically differentiated good each. Firms first sequentially and costlessly settle
in one of the two regions and then simultaneously compete in prices to maximize
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profits. Since we do not deal with quality choice -the variant firms produce is a
datum of the model-, the goods’ quality levels identify firms from the beginning
of the game.
Regions can differ with two respects, namely (a) the mass of consumers and
(b) the willingness to pay for quality: we will discuss these two issues separately,
keeping alternatively one variable constant across regions and letting the other
vary.
(a) When regions have different consumer masses, we normalize the mass of
consumers in region B to 1 and we assume that it is equal to α > 1 in region
A. In this case the consumers’ appreciation for quality is uniformly distributed
over the interval [0, 1] in both regions.
(b) Similarly, when regions differ because of the consumers’ willingness to
pay for quality, we assume that the parameter θ, which measures the extent of
quality appreciation among consumers, is uniformly distributed on the support
[0, 1] in region B and on the support [0, θ¯] in region A, with θ¯ > 1. Consumers’
masses are then normalized to 1 both in A and in B.
Notice that both α and θ¯ simultaneously represent the absolute size of region
A’s consumers’ mass or willingness to pay and a relative measure of asymmetry
between locations.
In both cases we assume that consumers are immobile, each of them buys
at most one unit of the good, either high- or low-quality, and that goods can be
shipped across regions at a constant transportation cost, borne by consumers,
equal to t. Moreover, markets are segmented: arbitrage between regions is ruled
out, so that firms can fully exploit their price-setting power.
Consumers in both regions are characterized by a utility function a` laMussa
and Rosen (1978). Assume that good i (i ∈ {h, l}) is produced in region j
(j ∈ {A,B}), then, the utility of consumer θ is:
u(.) =

θki − pji if he buys one unit of variant i residing in region j,
θki − pzi − t if he buys one unit of good i residing in region z 6= j, z ∈{A,B}
0 if he does not buy any product.
The parameter ki, i ∈ {h, l}, represents the quality level of good i, with kh > kl.
pji (res. p
z
i ) is the price charged by firm i in region j (res. region z).
Let the first element of the couple (jz) represent the location choice of firm h
and the second the choice of firm l. Clearly, there are four possible combinations:
(AB) with the high quality firm in region A and the low quality firm in B, (BA)
with the high quality firm in region B and the low quality firm in A, (AA)
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with both firms choosing to locate in region A and finally, (BB) with both firms
located in region B.
Let θj0 be the value of θ which identifies the consumer dwelling in region j
(j ∈ {A,B}) who is indifferent between not to consume and consume one unit
of the low-quality product; let θj1 be the value of θ identifying the consumer
dwelling in region j who is indifferent between buying one unit of the low quality
product and one unit the high quality one. The marginal consumers θj0 and θ
j
1
take different values in correspondence of the possible location choices.
(i) Consider the case (AB) first. In region A, the solution to the following
equation:
θkl − pAl − t = 0,
implies θA0 = (p
A
l + t)/kl, while the solution to:
θkh − pAh = θkl − pAl − t,
gives θA1 =
(
pAh − pAl − t
)
/ (kh − kl). For region B, θ0 solves:
θkl − pBl = 0,
so that θB0 = p
B
l /kl, while the indifference parameter θ
B
1 follows from:
θkl − pBl = θkh − pBh − t,
that implies θB1 = (p
B
h − pBl + t)/(kh − kl).
By using a similar procedure, it is easy to get that:3
(ii) in case (BA), θA0 = p
A
l /kl, θ
A
1 =
(
pAh − pAl + t
)
/ (kh − kl), θB0 = (pBl +
t)/kl and θB1 = (p
B
h − pBl − t)/(kh − kl);
(iii) in case (AA), θA0 = p
A
l /kl, θ
A
1 =
(
pAh − pAl
)
/ (kh − kl), θB0 = (pBl + t)/kl
and θB1 = (p
B
h − pBl )/(kh − kl);
(iv) in case (BB), θA0 = (p
A
l +t)/kl, θ
A
1 =
(
pAh − pAl
)
/ (kh − kl), θB0 = pBl /kL
and θB1 = (p
B
h − pBl )/(kh − kl).
Notice that when firms locate in the same region, say j, the marginal con-
sumers in that region are not affected by transportation costs. In the other, say
z, the consumer indifferent between the purchase of the two variants is not af-
fected by transportation costs neither -he has to incur them for consuming both
variants. By contrast the consumer in z indifferent between consuming the
3In order not to burden the notation we will not introduce another index on the marginal
consumers’ parameters to identify the location choices by firms: the cases will be treated
separately and no confusion will arise.
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low-quality variant or not consuming at all is affected by the burden of trans-
portation costs. This asymmetry will play a fundamental role in explaining the
results of the paper. Notice that transportation costs will enter the analysis
through equilibrium prices as well, as firms optimize taking into account their
existence, but this will determine a second-order effect only.
We assume that there are no fixed costs and marginal production costs are con-
stant and nil, moreover we assume that transportation costs are low enough to
guarantee that both firms sell positive quantities of product on both markets.4
This set of assumptions serves us to focus on the study of strategic location
choice, avoiding all the issues related to production and transportation tech-
nologies which, even though interesting, would shift the focus of the study away
from strategic location choice.
When regions have different sizes (case (a) above), profits to the low quality
producer are:
pijzl = α
(
θA1 − θA0
)
pAl +
(
θB1 − θB0
)
pBl , (1)
while the profits for the high quality one:
pijzh = α
(
1− θA1
)
pAh +
(
1− θB1
)
pBh . (2)
When regions present a different willingness to pay (case (b) above) and the
location choice is (jz), profits of the firm selling the low quality variant write:
pijzl =
1
θ¯
(
θA1 − θA0
)
pAl +
(
θB1 − θB0
)
pBl , (3)
while profits of the firm supplying the high quality one equal:
pijzh =
1
θ¯
(
θ¯ − θA1
)
pAh +
(
1− θB1
)
pBh . (4)
The timing of the game is the following: in the first stage firms sequentially
and irreversibly choose their location, we call the leader the firm that chooses
the first and the follower the second mover. In the second stage firms simulta-
neously and non-cooperatively set prices given the location choices of the first
stage. We opt for a sequential-move game as we are interested in studying the
firms’ incentives to cluster in one region region or to disperse, and the sequential
location choice better fits this aim.5
4Admittedly the last assumption is rather vague: the following analysis will provide a more
accurate formulation. See subsection (3.1)
5If the game were simultaneous in location choice the only difference would be multiplicity
of Nash equilibria as it can be inferred by following analysis.
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3 Equilibrium analysis
In order to find the (pure-strategy) subgame perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of
the game will solve the model backwards, starting from the simultaneous price
competition.
3.1 Price competition
The second stage of the game is solved through standard maximization tech-
niques, deriving first order conditions for prices, and observing that second order
conditions are always satisfied: we will not bother the reader with these calcu-
lations, reporting the second stage equilibrium prices and profits in Appendix
A1 and A2. Both in the cases of different consumers masses and willingnesses
to pay, in order to have positive equilibrium prices demands for the high- and
the low-quality variant in all regions for all location choices we assume that
t < kl(kh−kl)2kh−kl (see note 4).
3.2 Location choice
In the first stage the high (h-) and low (l-) quality firms choose sequentially
and non-cooperatively the region in which they produce. In the following we
refer to location outcomes (AA) and (BB) as agglomeration ones and to (AB)
and (BA) as dispersion ones. Two forces play a role in determining the firms’
location choices: we label the first one competitive effect and the second one is
the market potential effect.
In order to better understand the former of these two forces, firstly consider
the case of identical regions (i.e. α = 1 and θ¯ = 1) so that all effects coming
from asymmetries between markets are neutralized. Since dispersion is a way
to relax price competition through transportation costs, when firms choose to
locate in different regions, they realize higher equilibrium profits than in the case
in which both products are manufactured in the same region. This emerges
simply by observing that the difference between equilibrium profits realized
under dispersion and agglomeration is strictly positive. Indeed we get that:
piBAh − piAAh = piABl − piAAl =
2kh(2kh − kl)t2
(kh − kl)(4kh − kl)2 .
Therefore, in absence of any asymmetry, firms are better off dispersing than
agglomerating. Consider, for example, the choice of the h-firm if the l-one is
in A: “moving” from (BA) to (AA) implies a decrease of the profits realized in
region B that is not compensated by the increase of the profits in region A. The
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same argument applies to any other agglomeration outcome for firm h as well
as for firm l. Observe that the incentive to dispersion is equal for both firms;
they earn higher profits in the region to which they “move”, but “lose” profits
in the region they leave. However, there is slight difference between the two
producers: when “moving” from a dispersion to an agglomeration location the
gains and losses for the high-quality firm are both higher than the ones for the
low-quality firm. This feature, which is irrelevant in case of symmetric locations
(gains cancel out with losses for both firms) plays a crucial role when regions
differ in terms of market size.
Finally notice that dispersion incentives are increasing with the extent of
transportation costs: with positive transportation costs6 and symmetric regions,
firms prefer dispersion: their role in loosening competition is crucial. Indeed
locating “far away” from the competitor, i.e. choosing dispersion, reduces the
competitiveness of the firms on both export markets, since transportation costs
distort prices, and hence, symmetrically, strengthens the position of each firm
in its own location.
The other force that influences equilibrium outcomes, namely the market
potential effect, stems out from market size and willingness to pay asymmetries
which render region A a priori better than the other for each agent. Indeed,
if firms were monopolists on the market, so that the competition effect would
disappear, each one would prefer to locate in region A and to export the good to
region B. The bigger consumer mass in that region or its consumers’ higher will-
ingness to pay would be better exploited without distorting A-dwellers choices
through transportation costs.7
Each firm will hence face a trade-off between the competition and market
potential effects, the latter pushing firms to locate in region A as long as θ or
α are bigger than unity, and the former pushing them to locate one far away
from the other. The resulting of these two forces will determine equilibrium
outcomes.
We treat separately how regions’ asymmetries in terms of market size and
willingness to pay influence firms’ location choices.
6When t = 0, namely transportation costs are absent, the two locations collapse into one
and hence the distinction between dispersion and agglomeration is immaterial
7To ascertain this point, the reader can consider the location choices of a single-variant
monopolist alternatively when α and θ¯ exceed unity. Both with size and income asymmetries,
the unique optimal choice of such an agent is to locate in region A and to export in B.
The interested reader can formally solve this case as an exercise, although calculations are
available.
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3.2.1 Different market size
Assume that regions have different size, i.e. α > 1. In such a case, the benefit
to locate in the larger region arises for both firms. Clearly, this implies that,
if one of the two firms is located in the smaller region, the other prefers to
locate in the larger one since the benefit of dispersion would be reinforced by
the convenience of trading in a larger market. Indeed it is easy to check that
piABh > pi
BB
h and pi
BA
l > pi
BB
l for all α > 1. Similarly, each firm, at a dispersion
equilibrium, prefers to locate in the larger region: piABh > pi
BA
h and pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l .
More interestingly, if one firm is located in the larger region, the choice of
the other one depends on the extent of asymmetry in terms of consumers’ mass.
Comparing piAAh with pi
BA
h and pi
AA
l with pi
AB
l , we get that:
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piAAh − piBAh R 0 iff α R α1 =
4kh(kh − kl) + klt
4kh(kh − kl) + klt− 2kht ,
piAAl − piABl R 0 iff α R α2 =
2kl(kh − kl) + 3klt− 2kht
2kl(kh − kl) + klt− 2kht .
Observe that α2 > α1 > 1.
The results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Let α > 1, then
(i) If 1 < α < α1, there are two possible equilibria, at which location choice
exhibits dispersion: (AB) and (BA), the leader choosing region A.
(ii) If α1 < α < α2, independently on the order of moves, the equilibrium is
unique and exhibits dispersion, the firms’ location choice is (AB).
(iii) If α > α2, the equilibrium is unique and exhibits agglomeration: the
equilibrium location choice is (AA).
Proof. Remember that piABh > pi
BB
h and pi
BA
l > pi
BB
l , pi
AB
h > pi
BA
h and
piBAl > pi
AB
l for all α > 1 and t > 0.
(i) Assume that 1 < α < α1, from the previous inequalities we obtain piABh >
piBAh > pi
AA
h and pi
AB
h > pi
BB
h for the h-firm, and similarly, pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l > pi
AA
l
and piBAl > pi
BB
l for the l-firm. It is clear that if the role of the leader is played
by the high-quality firm, it will choose region A. Hence the low-quality producer
will find optimal to choose region B. A similar reasoning applies if the leader
is the low-quality firm: it will choose region A leaving region B to its rival.
(ii) If α1 < α < α2, then we have that piAAh > pi
BA
h , pi
AB
h > pi
BB
h and pi
AB
h >
piBAh for the h-quality producer, while pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l > pi
AA
l and pi
BA
l > pi
BB
l for
8See Appendix A1.
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the l-quality producer. The high-quality firm has a dominant strategy choosing
region A, consequently the low-quality producer selects region B both acting as
a leader or as a follower.
(iii) Move finally to the case α > α2. For the high-quality we have that
piABh > pi
BB
h , pi
AB
h > pi
BA
h and pi
AA
h > pi
BA
h . Similarly, for the low-quality
firm: piBAl > pi
BB
l , pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l and pi
AA
l > pi
AB
l . Both firms have a dominant
strategy: locating in region A irrespective of the decision of their rival.
First of all, notice that when locations differ because of consumer masses, equi-
librium prices in the two locations are not affected by α, that measures the
extent of asymmetry in terms of market size (see Appendix A1); consequently,
an increase in the consumer mass in A does not influence the firm’s incentives
to disperse, which act through price competition.
Remember that the higher is α the higher the incentive to locate in region A
for both firms. When the difference in size between the two regions is “small”
(i.e. 1 < α < α1) the competitive effect overwhelms the market potential one:
the first firm choosing location selects the (slightly) more advantageous one, A,
and the second mover is forced by the competitive effect to locate in region B.
As α increases, the market potential effect becomes more and more important
and the incentives to locate in region A increase for both firms, irrespective of
the presence of the other agent, but the incentives are always bigger for the
high-quality firm; indeed one can check that:
piAAh − piBAh > piAAl − piABl , for any t > 0 and α > 1.
To firm h hence, it becomes more profitable to select region A in larger intervals
for α, no matter what is the (preceding or following) choice of its rival. By cal-
culating the partial derivatives one can show that the incentives to agglomerate
in region A increase faster with α for the high-quality firm:
∂(piAAl − piABl )
∂α
<
∂(piAAh − piBAh )
∂α
.
When α increases, profits earned by firms in region A grow in configurations
(AA) and (BA) for the high-quality firm and in (AA) and (AB) for the low-
quality one, but at a higher rate for the former.
This depends on the fact that, as it is shown above, the gain realized in
region A when the high-quality firm moves from (AB) to (AA) is larger than
the one obtained by the low-quality firm when it moves from (BA) to (AA), and
the increases in α increase this gap.9 The intuition for this asymmetry has to
9We could conclude that it is more costly for a l-firm than for a h-firm to locate close to a
rival firm.
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be found in the “intrinsic advantage” the higher quality producers enjoy over
low-quality ones in models of vertical product differentiation with symmetric
marginal production costs.
If α1 < α < α2, the high-quality firm has a dominant move in choosing loca-
tion A: the higher volume of potential sales in region A increase the opportunity
cost of avoiding direct competition with the low-quality producer up to a point
in which it is more profitable to -possibly- agglomerate in A. Dispersion forces
(the competitive effect) still rule the location choices of the low-quality firm.
Hence the latter settles, independently on the fact of being leader or follower,
in the region not occupied by the h-firm.
Finally, when α exceeds α2, agglomerating in A is a dominant move for the
l-firm as well, as the market potential effect overwhelms the competitive one for
this agent too: at the only SPNE of the game firms agglomerate in region A.
3.2.2 Different willingness to pay
Move now to the analysis of regions characterized by different willingnesses to
pay. The uniform distribution of consumer types along the support implies that
the average willingness to pay in A is θ¯2 , while in B it is
1
2 ; clearly
θ¯
2 >
1
2 as θ¯ > 1.
As we pointed out in the introduction, an agent’s higher willingness to pay can
be interpreted as a larger income of that agent, hence region A is characterized
by a larger average income than region B; moreover the least willingness to pay
-and so income- in both regions is the same: region A is richer than region B.
If one of the two firms is located in the poorer region (B), the other prefers
to locate in the richer one since -similarly to the previous case- the benefit of
dispersion would be reinforced by the convenience of trading directly in a market
with consumers characterized by a higher willingness to pay. Indeed piABh > pi
BB
h
and piBAl > pi
BB
l for all θ¯ > 1.
Moreover, each firm, at a dispersion equilibrium, prefers to locate in the
larger region: piABh > pi
BA
h and pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l . More interestingly, if one firm is
located in the richer region, the choice of the other one depends on the extent of
asymmetry in terms of consumers’ preferences. As it is shown in Appendix A2,
by comparing piBAh with pi
AA
h and pi
AA
l with pi
AB
l , we get, for the high-quality
firm:
piAAh − piBAh < 0 for all θ¯ > 1.
For the low-quality one, assuming that the quality difference between the two
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producers is large enough,10 we have:
piAAl − piABl Q 0 iff θ¯ Q θ¯1 =
(2kh − kl)
(2kh − 3kl) .
Our results are again summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 Let θ > 1 and kh > 32kl, then
(i) If 1 < θ¯ < θ¯1, the game has two equilibria and both exhibit dispersion.
The possible location choices are (AB) or (BA), the leader choosing region A.
(ii) If θ¯ > θ¯1, independently of the order of moves, there is a unique equilib-
rium which exhibits dispersion: location choice is (BA).
Proof. Remember that piABh > pi
BB
h and pi
BA
l > pi
BB
l , pi
AB
h > pi
BA
h and
piBAl > pi
AB
l for all θ¯ > 1 and t > 0.
(i) When 1 6 θ¯ < θ¯1, from the previous inequalities we obtain piABh >
piBAh > pi
AA
h and pi
AB
h > pi
BB
h for the h-firm, and similarly, pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l > pi
AA
l
and piBAl > pi
BB
l for the l-firm. Observe that both firms tend to locate in
different regions because they prefer dispersion to agglomeration. Thus the
only equilibrium is for the first mover to choose region A and for the follower
to choose region B. Obviously, the leader takes advantage of moving first by
locating in the richer region;
(ii) If θ¯ > θ¯1, we still have that piABh > pi
BA
h > pi
AA
h and pi
AB
h > pi
BB
h for
the h-firm, while piBAl > pi
BB
l , pi
BA
l > pi
AB
l and pi
AA
l > pi
AB
l for the l-quality
producer. Hence, locating in region A represents a dominant move for the low
quality producer. Therefore, even if the high quality firm moves first, knowing
that the l-firm always plays the dominant move, the h-firm will choose to locate
in region B.
According to proposition 2, when the difference in income between the two
regions is small, so that the regions are almost equally wealthy, the competitive
effect overwhelms the market potential one: the leader still prefers to grasp the
opportunity to settle in the -slightly- richer region A, and the follower prefers
to avoid direct competition both in A and in B choosing the -slightly- poorer
region B. As θ¯ grows, for both firms the opportunity cost to disperse in region B
if the rival is in A becomes higher and higher. Nonetheless for the high-quality
firm the competitive effect still rules: if the other firm is already settled in A it
is still worth to disperse in B. By contrast, the market potential effects takes
10We assume that kh >
3
2
kl. If kh <
3
2
kl then the only equilibrium outcome as for location
choice is the one proposed in part (i) of Proposition 2.
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over for the low-quality firm when θ¯ exceeds θ¯1, so that this agent prefers to
settle in region A even if its rival is already there or will choose to be there.
It is easy to check that the incentives to agglomerate in A are higher for the
low-quality producer:
piAAh − piBAh < piAAl − piABl , for any t > 0 and θ¯ > 1,
It can be checked that
∂(piAAl − piABl )
∂θ¯
>
∂(piAAh − piBAh )
∂θ¯
Intuitively, this depends on the fact that when θ¯ increases, the high-quality firm
is able to exploit more easily the power deriving from the higher quality of the
good it sells by minimizing the (negative) impact of transportation costs on the
profits realized in the market A at location (BA). The reason for this asymmetry
between the two firms can be found in the observation we proposed after the
identification of the marginal consumers in the previous section. By locating in
region B if the high-quality producer is in A, the low-quality producer knows
that transportation costs will influence the position of the consumer who is in-
different between purchasing the low-quality variant and the high-quality one
as well as of the position of the consumer indifferent between consuming the
low-quality variant and not consuming in market A. Both these effects influence
negatively the profits of the low-quality producer, on one side making less con-
sumers willing to consume at all, and on the other side making consumers shift
from the low- to the high-quality variant. When the richness of A’s consumers
becomes grater and greater this double source of distortion deriving form locat-
ing in B becomes a too heavy burden to be paid, and choosing region A both
as a leader or as a follower results a dominant action. On the contrary, the
high-quality producer, locating in B if its rival is in A, dampens competition in
region B and suffers a distortion due to transportation costs on the left-end of
its demand only.11
This effect is in principle present in the scenario in which firms differ be-
cause of market size as well, but there is a fundamental difference in the two
cases. Indeed in the case in which regions differ because of consumers’ size
11This point can be ascertained by working out a model in which the left end of the low-
quality firm’s demand is not affected by transportation costs on its export market, so that
their only influence is in the determination of the border between the high- and the low-quality
demand. In this model the only equilibrium exhibits dispersion. The same result holds for a
model in which the market is covered: by assumption all consumers buy one unit of the good
so endogenously transportation costs do not influence the left end of the low-quality firm’s
demand. Both types of model are available upon request.
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the asymmetry parameter α does not influence equilibrium prices in location
A (see Appendix A1), and hence does not affect marginal consumers and de-
mand repartition between firms in that region. By contrast, when regions differ
because of the wealth of their consumers, the parameter θ¯, which identifies the
upper bound of the quality appreciation distribution, does influence equilibrium
prices (see Appendix A2) and hence marginal consumers and demand reparti-
tion between firms in market in A. The interaction of θ¯ and t in determining
the prices drives the results. Since the incentive to agglomerate stops growing
as θ¯ becomes infinitely large, it is important to check what happens to this limit
case for both firms; we get that:
lim
θ¯→∞
(piAAh − piBAh ) = −
(2kh − kl)klt2
(kh − kl)(4kh − kl)2 < 0,
lim
θ¯→∞
(piAAh − piBAh ) =
(2kh − 3kl)(2kh − kl)kht2
(kh − kl)(4kh − kl)2kl > 0.
The h-firm never prefers agglomeration in A to dispersion.
When θ¯ > θ¯1, locating in A becomes a dominant move for the low-quality
firm. Consequently, if the h-firm moves first, it anticipates the choice of the
l-firm by choosing to settle in region B.
4 Welfare analysis
Let us turn to welfare analysis; our aim is to determine the socially optimal
location, that is the location in correspondence of which the aggregate social
welfare is maximized by a benevolent social planner. Because of our focus on
location, we assume that the social planner is unable to influence the pricing
behavior of the firms but can impose location selection. The measure for social
welfare we adopt in this paper is the standard one in vertical differentiation
analysis: we add up consumers’ surplus and firms’ profits over the two regions,
subtracting transportation costs. The explicit functional form of the welfare
measure can be found in the appendices A3 and A4.
4.1 Different market size
When regions differ in the market size, the comparison between locations in
terms of social welfare gives us the following result:
Proposition 3 Let α > 1, then the socially optimal location choice is
(i) (AB) iff 1 < α < α3;
(ii) (AA) iff α3 < α.
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Proof. See Appendix A3.
The value of α3 can be found in Appendix A3.
To give an intuition to these results, notice first that it can be proved that, when
regions are completely identical, social welfare under dispersion is larger than
under agglomeration.12 When the market size is similar between the two regions
(i.e. 1 < α < α3), this result continues to hold. However, social welfare is larger
in (AB) than in (BA): in order to consume the high-quality good, transportation
costs have to be paid by consumers of region B when the location choice is
(AB) and by consumers of region A when firms’ location is (BA); since region
A is more populated, locating the h-firm in region A allows a larger mass of
consumers to select that variant -as they do not have to pay transportation costs
for it- Symmetrically, the appeal of the low-quality variant in A is reduced by
the presence of the transportation cost. The distortional effect of transportation
costs on the purchase of the h-good is minimized in (AB).
When the market size of region A becomes large enough (i.e. α > α3), the
component of social welfare in region A plays an important role in explaining
why it is desirable to agglomerate the production of the two variants in this
region from a social point of view. By doing so transportation cost do not
directly 13 determine the consumer indifferent between the high- and the low-
quality variant neither in region A nor in region B. With respect to the (AB)
configuration this implies a reduction of the demand for the high-quality inA but
an increase in B, but simultaneously an increase in the number of consumers who
purchase the l-variant in the larger location (and who did not consume under
configuration (AB)) as they do not have to pay transportation costs longer. By
the same argument -inverted- some consumers in the left-end of the distribution
in the small region B shift to no-consumption. The balance of these effects
determines the social preference for location outcome (AA).
Finally, let us consider the threshold values of the market size in correspon-
dence of which there is a switch from dispersion to agglomeration in the decen-
tralized economy and in the social optimum. By direct comparison between α3
and α2, we get the following:
Remark 1 Let α > 1, then
α3 > α2.
12Clearly in this case location outcomes (AB) or (BA) lead to the same welfare level.
13Transportation costs enter equilibrium prices, but this is a second order effect.
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Some observations are worth. First, when regions are almost equal (α < α1)
oligopolistic competition may drive to an equilibrium which exhibits “bad” dis-
persion: if the leader is the low-quality firm then the expected outcome is
(BA), which is not optimal. By contrast if the leader is the h-firm, uncon-
strained competition leads to the optimal equilibrium locations. Second, when
α2 < α < α3, firms inefficiently agglomerate in region A. Interestingly, how-
ever, when α1 < α < α2 or α3 < α, unregulated oligopolistic behavior leads to
socially optimal location choices.14
4.2 Different willingness to pay
When regions differ in the willingness to pay we get the following result:
Proposition 4 Let θ > 1 and kh > 32kl, then the socially optimal location is
(BA).
Proof. See Appendix A4.
The socially optimal location in case of different willingnesses to pay for quality
between regions is unique for all degrees of asymmetry and prescribes to locate
the high-quality producer in the poorer region and the low-quality producer in
the richer one.
Some intuitive insight into this result may be obtained by observing that,
with null marginal costs of production, the location choice in correspondence
of which the purchase of the high-quality good is more viable, is also the one
that maximizes welfare. Now, focus on the production of the high-quality good.
Since the activity of transportation is costly and directly affects the welfare of
the consumers residing in the region that imports the good, by reducing their
utility, it is desirable that transportation costs are paid by the consumers with
higher willingness to pay. Now, (BA) is the location choice that minimizes
the distortionary effect of transportation costs on the purchase of the high-
quality good. In fact, for buying the h-good when firms’ location is (BA),
transportation costs are only paid by the residents in region A, who exhibit a
higher willingness to pay for quality. Symmetrically, locating the l-firm in region
A reduces -because of the transportation cost- the appeal of its variant to the
dwellers of region B, making a higher share of them opt for the high-quality
product, whose consumption generates higher utility.
Finally notice that, interestingly, there is coincidence -as far as location choices
14The distortion due to oligopoly pricing remains.
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are concerned- between the oligopolistic outcome and the socially optimal one,
as long as the difference in wealth between regions is large enough (θ¯ > θ¯1). By
contrast, market equilibrium is socially optimal when 1 < θ¯ < θ¯1 if and only if
the leader is the low-quality producer.
5 Discussion
A first interesting difference in the two cases analyzed concerns the “aggregate”
equilibrium location outcomes dispersion vs. agglomeration. In both cases, a
“limited” asymmetry between countries leads to dispersion at equilibrium; but,
as asymmetry increases, in the case of different consumers’ masses the only out-
come becomes agglomeration, while in the case of different willingnesses to pay
dispersion is still expected. As a consequence, differences in income between lo-
cations cannot explain the creation of industrial clusters, at least in our model
in which technological issues are excluded.
Disentangling now the specific firms’ location choices at equilibrium, it is worth
to emphasize the striking result that when a region is “much richer” than the
other15 (see part (ii) of Proposition 2) then at the only equilibrium of the game
the high-quality firm settles in the poorer region, even if it is the first to choose
location, leaving the richer to its rival. It is interesting to apply this result to
a scenario of trade liberalization. Imagine, to this end, a situation in which,
for some reason, both firms are installed in region A under a closed economy
regime -suppose, for example, that transportation costs are prohibitively high.
Assume now that, at a certain date, trade between locations A and B becomes
possible for both firms -for example a technological improvement dramatically
and exogenously lowers transportation costs. Our model suggests that not only
trade would emerge between the two locations, but that firms would -in absence
of fixed costs- relocate too. If region B is “much poorer” than region A, the firm
that would leave the wealthy location is the high-quality producer. Of course
our story abstracts from technological asymmetries between firms, presence of
fixed costs at plant level, and more importantly region-specific production factor
characteristics (e.g. presence of skilled work force, lower labor costs or more so-
phisticated technologies available...). Still this result, as well as the other ones,
univocally points out the effects of pure strategic location choice.
Finally, consider the welfare implications of our analysis. A first interesting
remark is that there are significant parametric regions in which unconstrained
15And variants are ”differentiated enough”
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oligopolistic competition yields to the socially optimal location choices. In addi-
tion, in all the parametric regions which display multiple equilibria, one equilib-
rium is socially optimal. A benevolent social planner can hence play a “minimal
role” just imposing to firms the appropriate decision ordering, so that the con-
sequent strategic behavior leads to the social optimum. Yet, there remains a
parametric situation (namely when α2 < α < α3 in the case of different mar-
ket sizes) in which strategic behavior is unable to generate to socially optimal
locations, and hence a more active role for the social planner is called for.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of differences in the willingness to pay and the
market size on the allocation of industrial activity in a vertically differentiated
oligopoly. We consider a two-stage location-price game with the following tim-
ing: in the first stage firms sequentially choose their location, and in the second
stage they simultaneously and non-cooperatively set prices given the location
choices of the first stage. The location decision is crucially determined by the
trade-off between the competition and the market potential effects. We show
that this trade-off is differently faced by the high- and low-quality producers; we
capture different firms’ incentives by analyzing a game in which location choices
are sequential.
We have restricted our analysis to a context in which the quality levels of
variants are exogenous, as well as transportation costs. Interesting extensions
would be to make the quality choice endogenous and to deal with a more de-
veloped treatment of transportation costs. The analysis of these issues is in our
agenda.
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Appendix A1
In this Appendix, we report the equilibrium prices and profits when locations
have different consumer masses. In location choice (AB) we have:
pA∗l =
kl(kh − kl)− t(2kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl) + tkh
4kh − kl , (A1.1)
pB∗l =
kl(kh − kl + t)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl + t)
4kh − kl − t. (A1.2)
In location choice (BA):
pA∗l =
kl(kh − kl + t)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl + t)
4kh − kl − t, (A1.3)
pB∗l =
kl(kh − kl)− t(2kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl) + tkh
4kh − kl . (A1.4)
In location choice (AA):
pA∗l =
kl(kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl)
4kh − kl , (A1.5)
pB∗l =
(kh − kl)(kl − 2t)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
(kh − kl)(2kh − t)
4kh − kl . (A1.6)
Finally, in location choice (BB):
pA∗l =
(kh − kl)(kl − 2t)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
(kh − kl)(2kh − t)
4kh − kl , (A1.7)
pB∗l =
kl(kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl)
4kh − kl . (A1.8)
As a standard result, equilibrium prices are unaffected by the different con-
sumers’ mass between regions.
We restrict the analysis to the case in which transportation costs are low
enough to keep all the equilibrium prices and quantities positive, i.e. t <
kl(kh−kl)
2kh−kl .
By using eq. (3), (4) and (A1.1)-(A1.8), we obtain the equilibrium profits
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realized in correspondence of each location choices:
piABl =
kh{k2l (kl−t)2(1+α)−2khkl(kl−t)(kl+klα−2tα)+k2h[4t2α−4tαkl+k2l (1+α)]}
(kh−kl)kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piABh =
{k2l t2−4klkht(kl+t)+4k4h(1+α)−4k3h[2kl(1+α)−t(α−2)]+k2h[4k2l (1+α)+t2(4+α)−4klt(α−3)]}
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBAl =
kh{k2l (kl−t)2(1+α)−2khkl(kl−t)(kl+klα−2t)+k2h[4t2−4tkl+k2l (1+α)]}
(kh−kl)kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBAh =
{αk2l t2−4αklkht(kl+t)+4k4h(1+α)−4k3h[2kl(1+α)+t(2α−1)]+k2h[4k2l (1+α)+t2(1+4α)+4klt(3α−1)]}
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)2 ,
piAAl =
kh(kh−kl)[4t2+k2l (1+α)−4klt]
kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piAAh =
(kh−kl)[t2+4k2h(1+α)−4kht]
(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBBl =
kh(kh−kl)[4t2α+k2l (1+α)−4kltα]
kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBBh =
(kh−kl)[αt2+4k2h(1+α)−4khtα]
(4kh−kl)2 .
It is easy to check that piABh > pi
BB
h and pi
BA
l > pi
BB
l for all α > 1. Comparing
piBAh with pi
AA
h and pi
AA
l with pi
AB
l gives:
piBAh − piAAh =
(2kh−kl)t{2kh[2kl(α−1)+tα]−4k2h(α−1)−klt(α−1)}
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)2 R 0 iff α Q α1,
piABl − piAAl = kh(2kh−kl)t{kl[2kl(α−1)−t(α−3)]−2kh(kl−t)(α−1)}kl(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)2 R 0 iff α Q α2,
where α1 =
4kh(kh−kl)+klt
4kh(kh−kl)+klt−2kht and α2 =
2kl(kh−kl)+3klt−2kht
2kl(kh−kl)+klt−2kht .
Appendix A2
In this Appendix, we report the equilibrium prices and profits when con-
sumers have different willingness to pay. In location choice (AB) we have:
pA∗l =
θ¯kl(kh − kl)− t(2kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
2θ¯kh(kh − kl) + tkh
4kh − kl , (A2.1)
pB∗l =
kl(kh − kl + t)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl + t)
4kh − kl − t. (A2.2)
In location choice (BA):
pA∗l =
kl[θ¯(kh − kl) + t]
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
2kh[θ¯(kh − kl) + t]
4kh − kl − t, (A2.3)
pB∗l =
kl(kh − kl)− t(2kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl) + tkh
4kh − kl . (A2.4)
In location choice (AA):
pA∗l =
θ¯kl(kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
2θ¯kh(kh − kl)
4kh − kl , (A2.5)
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pB∗l =
(kh − kl)(kl − 2t)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
(kh − kl)(2kh − t)
4kh − kl . (A2.6)
Finally, in (BB):
pA∗l =
(kh − kl)(θ¯kl − 2t)
4kh − kl , p
A∗
h =
(kh − kl)(2θ¯kh − t)
4kh − kl , (A2.7)
pB∗l =
kl(kh − kl)
4kh − kl , p
B∗
h =
2kh(kh − kl)
4kh − kl . (A2.8)
From eq. (A1.1), (A1.3), (A1.5) and (A1.7) we observe that in all the possible
location choices, the equilibrium prices of the high and low quality producers
in region A depend positively on the support of preferences in the same region,
θ¯; in other terms, the presence of wealthier consumers in region A allows firms
to set higher prices in this market for both products. This translates into a
positive relation between θ¯ and firms’ equilibrium profits which are shown in
the following. The assumption t < kl(kh−kl)2kh−kl allows to keep all the equilibrium
prices positive, guaranteeing that firms are operative in all the possible location
choices.
From eq. (3), (4) and (A2.1)-(A2.8), we obtain the equilibrium profits real-
ized in correspondence of each location choices:
piABl =
kh{k2l [t2(1+θ¯)+k2l θ¯(1+θ¯)−4kltθ¯]+k2h[4t2−4tθ¯kl+k2l θ¯(1+θ¯)]−2khkl[2t2−4tklθ¯+k2l θ¯(1+θ¯)]}
θ¯(kh−kl)kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piABh =
{k2l t2θ¯−4klkht(kl+t)θ¯+4k4hθ¯(1+θ¯)−4k3hθ¯[2kl(1+θ¯)+t]+k2h[4k2l θ¯(1+θ¯)+t2(1+4θ¯)+8kltθ¯]}
θ¯(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBAl =
kh{4k2ht2θ¯−4khklt(kh+t)θ¯+k4l θ¯(1+θ¯)−2k3l θ¯(kh+2t+θ¯kh)+k2l [8khtθ¯+t2(1+θ¯)+k2hθ¯(1+θ¯)]}
θ¯(kh−kl)kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBAh =
{k2l t2−4klkht(θ¯kl+t)θ¯+4k4hθ¯(1+θ¯)−4k3hθ¯[2kl(1+θ¯)+t]+k2h[4k2l θ¯(1+θ¯)+t2(4+θ¯)+8kltθ¯]}
θ¯(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)2 ,
piAAl =
kh(kh−kl)[4t2+k2l (1+θ¯)−4klt]
kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piAAh =
(kh−kl)[t2+4k2h(1+θ¯)−4kht]
(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBBl =
kh(kh−kl)[4t2+k2l θ¯(1+θ¯)−4kltθ¯]
kl(4kh−kl)2 ,
piBBh =
(kh−kl)[t2+4k2hθ¯(1+θ¯)−4khtθ¯]
(4kh−kl)2 .
We can simply check that piABh > pi
BB
h , pi
BA
l > pi
BB
l and pi
BA
h > pi
AA
h for all
θ¯ > 1. Comparing piAAl with piABl gives:
piAAl − piABl =
kh(2kh−kl)t2[kl+2kh(θ¯−1)−3klθ¯]
θ¯(kh−kl)kl(4kh−kl)2 R 0 iff θ¯ R θ¯1,
where θ¯1 =
(2kh−kl)
(2kh−3kl) .
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Appendix A3
In this Appendix we provide the calculations for the social welfare analysis
when regions show different market size. By using the equilibrium prices writ-
ten in eq. (A1.1)-(A1.8), we get the following values for the indifference taste
parameters respectively in locations (AB), (BA), (AA), (BB):
(AB)
{
θA0 =
kl(kh−kl)+2tkh
kl(4kh−kl)
θA1 =
2k2h+k
2
l−kh(3kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
θB0 =
kh−kl+t
4kh−kl
θB1 =
(2kh−kl)(kh−kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
(BA)
{
θA0 =
kh−kl+t
4kh−kl
θA1 =
(2kh−kl)(kh−kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
θB0 =
kl(kh−kl)+2tkh
kl(4kh−kl)
θB1 =
2k2h+k
2
l−kh(3kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
(AA)
{
θA0 =
kh−kl
4kh−kl
θA1 =
2kh−kl
4kh−kl
θB0 =
kl(kh−kl)+t(2kh+kl)
kl(4kh−kl)
θB1 =
2kh−kl+t
4kh−kl
(BB)
{
θA0 =
kl(kh−kl)+t(2kh+kl)
kl(4kh−kl)
θA1 =
2kh−kl+t
4kh−kl
θB0 =
kh−kl
4kh−kl
θB1 =
2kh−kl
4kh−kl
In correspondence of the four location choices, social welfare is:
SWAB = α
[∫ θA1
θA0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ 1
θA1
θkh dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
θkl dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
,
SWBA = α
[∫ θA1
θA0
θkl dθ +
∫ 1
θA1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
θkh dθ
]
,
SWAA = α
[∫ θA1
θA0
θkl dθ +
∫ 1
θA1
θkh dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
,
SWBB = α
[∫ θA1
θA0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ 1
θA1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
θkl dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
θkh dθ
]
.
Since locationA has a larger market size thanB, we conclude that agglomeration
in B is always strictly dominated by agglomeration in A from a social point
of view. Calculating the social welfare in correspondence of the four location
choices,16 we get that:
SWAB > SWAA > SWBA > SWBB iff 1 6 α < α3,
SWAA > SWAB > SWBA > SWBB iff α > α3,
with α3 =
4kl(2k
2
h−3khkl+k2l )−t(12k2h−25khkl+8k2l )
4kl(2k2h−3khkl+k2l )−t(12k2h−9khkl+2k2l )
.
16The computations are available on request.
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Appendix A4
In this Appendix we provide the main calculations for the social welfare
analysis when regions show different willingness to pay. By using the equilib-
rium prices written in eq. (A2.1)-(A2.8), we get the following values for the
indifference taste parameters respectively in firms’ locations (AB), (BA), (AA),
(BB):
(AB)
{
θA0 =
θ¯kl(kh−kl)+2tkh
kl(4kh−kl)
θA1 =
θ¯(2k2h+k
2
l )−kh(3θ¯kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
θB0 =
kh−kl+t
4kh−kl
θB1 =
(2kh−kl)(kh−kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
(BA)
 θ
A
0 =
θ¯(kh−kl)+t
4kh−kl
θA1 =
(2kh−kl)[θ¯(kh−kl)+t]
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
θB0 =
kl(kh−kl)+2tkh
kl(4kh−kl)
θB1 =
2k2h+k
2
l−kh(3kl+t)
(kh−kl)(4kh−kl)
(AA)
{
θA0 =
θ¯(kh−kl)
4kh−kl
θA1 =
θ¯(2kh−kl)
4kh−kl
θB0 =
kl(kh−kl)+t(2kh+kl)
kl(4kh−kl)
θB1 =
2kh−kl+t
4kh−kl
(BB)
{
θA0 =
θ¯kl(kh−kl)+t(2kh+kl)
kl(4kh−kl)
θA1 =
θ¯(2kh−kl)+t
4kh−kl
θB0 =
kh−kl
4kh−kl
θB1 =
2kh−kl
4kh−kl
In correspondence of the four location choices, social welfare is:
SWAB =
1
θ¯
[∫ θA1
θA0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ θ¯
θA1
θkh dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
θkl dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
,
SWBA =
1
θ¯
[∫ θA1
θA0
θkl dθ +
∫ θ¯
θA1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
θkh dθ
]
,
SWAA =
1
θ¯
[∫ θA1
θA0
θkl dθ +
∫ θ¯
θA1
θkh dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
,
SWBB =
1
θ¯
[∫ θA1
θA0
(θkl − t) dθ +
∫ θ¯
θA1
(θkh − t) dθ
]
+
[∫ θB1
θB0
θkl dθ +
∫ 1
θB1
θkh dθ
]
.
Substituting the equilibrium values for the indifference taste parameters,17 we
get that the highest social welfare is realized in (BA), in fact:
SWBA > SWAB > SWAA > SWBB iff 1 6 θ¯ < θ¯2,
SWBA > SWAA > SWAB > SWBB iff θ¯ > θ¯2,
where θ¯2 =
12k2h−9khkl+2k2l
12k2h−25khkl+8k2l
.
17The computations are available on request.
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